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27 
REASONING THROUGH CLASHES 
BETWEEN RELIGION AND EQUALITY: 
CASE LAW, SKEPTICS, AND SOCIAL 
COHERENCE 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN EGALITARIAN AGE. 
Nelson Tebbe.1 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2017. Pp. x + 288. $39.95 (Hardcover). 
Michael A. Helfand2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the few widely shared views regarding contemporary 
clashes between law and religion is that we are in a state of “deep 
contestation,”3 as increasing degrees of social, political and legal 
polarization have become the norm.4 Concern over this 
increasingly deep social division and political polarization has 
been particularly salient of late. Thus, the admixture of the 
constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage,5 litigation 
surrounding the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception 
mandate,”6 and claims for religious accommodation from laws 
that violate faith commitments has created a highly fraught legal 
environment. And this has led scholars to worry that 
disagreements have become so deep that there may not even be a 
way for those who differ to reason about these matters 
collectively. In the somewhat depressing words of John Inazu, 
 
 1. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
 2. Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Co-Director 
Diane and Guilford Glazer Institute for Jewish Studies. 
 3. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014). 
 4. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious 
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619 
(2015). 
 5. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 6. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
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“These deep and often irresolvable differences call into question 
our constitutional aspiration for ‘a more perfect union,’ our 
national metaphor of a great ‘melting pot,’ and the promise of our 
nation’s seal, E pluribus unum (‘Out of many, one’).”7 
Given the state of affairs, it is not surprising to now see 
scholarly works that not only attempt to resolve conflicts between 
law and religion, but that also aim to provide a method for how 
those from deeply divided viewpoints might reason about these 
conflicts.8 Nelson Tebbe’s recent book, Religious Freedom in an 
Egalitarian Age, is one such work and a masterful one at that. As 
Tebbe notes at the very outset of his book, “[m]any American[s] 
sense that they are living through a period of intense conflict 
between religious freedom and equality law” (p. 1). 
The book itself aims to provide a method for reasoning about 
these deep conflicts, what Tebbe refers to as social coherence. 
Drawing from John Rawls’s reflective equilibrium method, Tebbe 
asks participants to reason about concrete dilemmas between 
religion and equality, and then compare those resolutions about 
concrete dilemmas to build a coherent vision for addressing these 
types of conflicts. Tebbe then engages in this very type of 
reasoning to address a wide range of conflicts between religion 
and equality, including clashes over anti-discrimination laws in 
areas such as public accommodations and employment as well as 
debates over religious exemptions for public officials and 
government support of religion and religious institutions. 
The book itself is extraordinary in its ambition, erudition, 
and scope. Tebbe covers vast areas of constitutional law 
seamlessly, bringing the reader on a rich journey through the 
multiple spheres of law, politics, and moral reasoning relevant to 
the topics addressed in his book. This is, in many ways, far from 
surprising. Tebbe is one of the most talented and highly regarded 
experts in the law and religion field, and Religious Freedom in an 
Egalitarian Age reflects that expertise. The book is a must-read 
for all those who are working through questions of religious 
freedom, equality, and the relationship between church and state. 
Tebbe’s proposals for how the law ought to resolve these tense 
conflicts reflect his wisdom, knowledge, and ability to identify a 
 
 7. JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING 
THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE 4 (2016). 
 8. Indeed, John Inazu’s book is one such attempt. See id. 
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“careful approach” that “appreciates the power of arguments on 
both sides” that “can provide a stable, defensible foundation for 
the future of both free exercise and anti-discrimination law” (p. 
5). 
This review aims to assess Tebbe’s ultimate success in this 
ambitious project: that is, has Tebbe provided a useful and 
successful method for reasoning about these “intense conflicts” 
between religion and equality? All told, the review identifies 
some challenges for Tebbe’s method. To be sure, no attempt to 
navigate such conflicts will be immune from criticism and Tebbe’s 
framework has much to commend. The comments below 
therefore represent some questions for Tebbe’s framework and 
some thoughts on where more discussion might be necessary to 
shore up the social coherence method as articulated by Tebbe. 
II. PLURALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND THE PURPOSE OF 
SOCIAL COHERENCE 
Tebbe begins Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age with 
an explanation of the motivation behind the project. Tebbe notes 
the convergence among law and religion scholars that the doctrine 
is fundamentally “messy”—that is, legal decisions and choices 
related to religious freedom flow from a contorted amalgamation 
of multiple considerations, values, and principles. And these 
different pieces to the religious freedom present, at least 
superficially, a broader picture of irrationality and 
indeterminateness to the doctrine. 
In highlighting this convergence, Tebbe draws upon the work 
of two groups of scholars, groups he terms “pluralists” and 
“skeptics.” He classifies pluralists as those “who embrace the idea 
that multiple values are needed to account for correct judgments 
across the entire range of religious freedom cases” (p. 7) and 
includes such scholars as Kent Greenawalt, Marc DeGirolami, 
Alan Brownstein, Steven Shiffrin, Paul Horwitz (p. 203 n.17), and, 
apparently, Tebbe himself.9 But pluralism, in its use of different 
values, considerations, and principles, explains Tebbe, has 
become vulnerable to the growing criticism of skeptics across the 
 
 9. This is apparent throughout Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, but is also 
a characterization that Tebbe appears to have previously applied to his prior work. See 
Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363, 365 (2015) 
(describing some of his previous work as employing a “polyvalent method”).  
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political spectrum. As described by Tebbe, “Skeptics have been 
arguing not only that the jurisprudence on religious freedom is 
messy . . . but further that the law is inherently or necessarily 
patternless” (p. 5). Tebbe is quick to note that these skeptics do 
not advocate discarding the prevailing religious freedom 
enterprise, but instead encourage the law to “muddle through, 
seeking modus vivendi solutions without any hope of principled 
results” (p. 6). In this way, Tebbe notes that, ultimately, the 
proposals of skeptics and pluralists for addressing “ground-level 
conflict” are quite similar—employing a significant dose of 
pragmatics and “all-things-considered judgements” (p. 7)—even 
as they derive from somewhat divergent philosophical 
underpinnings. But this convergence, according to Tebbe, cannot 
mask the fundamental challenge of skeptics to pluralists. If a 
pluralist approach to religious freedom is to truly thrive, it must 
answer the charge of irrationality. And it is to this project that 
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is, in large part, 
dedicated. 
Thus, Tebbe dedicates the first section of his book to 
outlining his methodological approach that is geared to meeting 
the challenge of skepticism—that is, the inability to systemize 
religion clause doctrine in any meaningful and principled way. 
That method, which Tebbe first explored in a previous essay,10 is 
social coherence. Tebbe describes this first section as “relatively 
independent from the rest” of the book in that the latter sections 
can be understood independently (p. 13), but it is ultimately 
essential to appreciating Tebbe’s contribution to ongoing 
religious freedom jurisprudence. On Tebbe’s account, the best 
way to meet the existence of multiple and competing values at 
stake in religious debates is to employ social coherence, which 
asks us to mine our intuitions about how to navigate these plural 
commitments in concrete cases and then reason, in a deliberative 
fashion, from those concrete intuitions so that they increasingly 
fit together. 
Social coherence is thus a method that both utilizes a mode 
of reasoning that encourages thinking through a prism of 
coherence and also emphasizes the role of social dynamics in this 
process of reasoning. Noting his indebtedness to John Rawls’s 
theory of “reflective equilibrium,” Tebbe explains that when 
 
 10. Id. 
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people encounter new moral questions or dilemmas, “they 
evaluate their convictions by asking whether they fit together with 
each other” (p. 26). This process of assessing the fit of a person’s 
various commitments is different than reasoning directly from 
first principles and then applying them to concrete circumstances. 
Instead, it requires vacillating between considered judgments 
about concrete circumstances and general principles, thereby 
reasoning in a manner that increases the degree of overall 
coherence to our intuitions. In Tebbe’s words, this method can 
help explicate the overall rationality of pluralist judgments by 
“[o]scillating among judgments and principles,” thereby giving 
“legal actors a way to reason through problems that are highly 
intricate” (p. 30). Tebbe sees this approach as particularly useful 
in clashes between religion and equality, which implicate a wide 
range of considerations and values. In this way, Tebbe’s method 
is an attempt to rehabilitate a pluralist approach to these legal 
dilemmas. 
Tebbe is careful to note a number of features of a coherence 
approach to legal dilemmas. The first is that intuitions are meant 
to reinforce each other; that is, we test our intuitions about 
concrete cases by considering other similar cases to see if our 
multiple intuitions paint a coherent picture. In what might be 
viewed as a blockchain method of reasoning, the more our 
intuitions fit together, the more confident we can become in our 
outlook. By contrast, if the pieces of our intuitions fail to fit, it 
requires evaluating them in light of each other. 
A second important element of Tebbe’s theory is that a 
coherence method will only generate outcomes that are 
warranted or justified—as opposed to outcomes that are “real or 
true” (p. 27). This is a function of the fact that Tebbe’s project 
provides a mode of reasoning where individuals test their 
intuitions against their own intuitions. It does not advocate for a 
particular moral vision, just a method of moral reasoning that can 
leverage our own intuitions into a vision for how to resolve legal 
conflict. Thus, Tebbe notes: “religious freedom law leaves plenty 
of room for disagreement. Actors will recommend different 
solutions to a particular problem” (p. 30). 
This second qualification does raise the worry that 
conclusions derived through a method of coherence are ultimately 
arbitrary, and therefore skeptics who see this area of law as an 
amalgamation of arbitrary, indefinite, and sometimes 
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contradictory considerations are ultimately correct. In Tebbe’s 
view, this would be a mistake; when people generate outcomes 
through coherence reasoning, “they are saying that the solution 
coheres with their other constitutional commitments and that the 
alternative does not” (p. 39). Of course, all this means is that 
people can justify their conclusions based upon their own 
constitutional commitments in other cases, rendering their 
outcome still contingent and thus, to some extent, still grounded 
in other personal beliefs. But at least any particular judgment is 
proposed against the background of a systematic approach that 
fits with a range of concrete and specific commitments. In this 
way, Tebbe explains, the particular judgment is “backed by 
reasons” and can be “rationally justified” (p. 40). Accordingly, the 
skeptics’ charge of irrationality levelled against religious freedom 
jurisprudence, and in particular pluralist approaches to that 
jurisprudence, is ultimately unjustified. 
Tebbe employs this method to great effect in Part III of the 
book, titled “Applications,” where he evaluates the clash between 
religion and equality in anti-discrimination law, focusing on both 
public accommodations and employment law, as well as in cases 
of government funding and subsidy of religion and religious 
institutions. In each of these contexts, Tebbe outlines various 
paradigms for assessing each case, using both larger theoretical 
frameworks in conjunction with concrete cases to test the readers’ 
intuitions. For example, when it comes to public accommodations 
laws that protect LGBT people, Tebbe outlines two paradigms: 
religious exemptions from public accommodations laws that 
protect other classifications and “conscience clauses” that allow 
medical professionals to refuse participating in procedures that 
conflict with their religious commitments (pp. 127-29). Tebbe 
then toggles back and forth between those paradigms, outlining 
his argument for why the analogy to civil rights laws, as opposed 
to conscience clauses, is more apt. And to bolster this claim, 
Tebbe engages the reader with three concrete cases implicating 
public accommodations laws: one regarding religious facilities 
open to the public, one regarding religiously affiliated adoption 
agencies, and one regarding the high-profile cases of businesses 
refusing to provide their services at same-sex weddings. Using 
those cases to triangulate around a set of cohesive legal 
conclusions, Tebbe provides his approach for how courts should 
evaluate claims for religious exemption to public 
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accommodations laws, an approach that ultimately encourages 
courts to reject those claims for exemption (pp 136-38).11 
In these chapters, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is 
at its very best. It provides methodological guidance to leverage 
how people think about complex cases that pit the competing 
values of religion and equality against each other. To be sure, the 
reader might very well quibble—or outright disagree—with 
Tebbe’s conclusions.12 But Tebbe is fully aware of that possibility, 
regularly noting that his method of social coherence does not 
justify only one outcome to these dilemmas. Tebbe simply hopes 
the book provides a method for reasoning about these dilemmas 
that embraces the existence of multiple values, and demonstrates 
how people can provide justified and warranted reasons for 
reaching a particular outcome notwithstanding—or, in fact, 
maybe because of—these competing values that often pull each 
person in opposite directions. In this regard, Religious Freedom in 
an Egalitarian Age is an unequivocal success. 
III. PRINCIPLES, CASES AND THE APPLICATION OF 
SOCIAL COHERENCE 
The book, however, has another section, sandwiched 
between the first part on method and the third part on 
applications. In this second section, Tebbe aims to answer the 
question “What principles should guide our thinking about 
conflicts between religious freedom and equality law?” (p. 49). 
Drawing from his pluralist orientation, Tebbe identifies “four 
primary commitments that run through defensible constitutional 
decisions in this area” (p. 49): avoiding harm to others, fairness to 
others, freedom of association, and government non-
endorsement. For each of these principles, Tebbe articulates both 
their nature and origin, providing some helpful examples so as to 
flesh out what they each entail as a matter of concrete 
commitment in practice. 
 
 11. For more on the particulars of how Tebbe applies his theory to contemporary 
conflicts between religion and equality, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Value of 
Moderation, Tebbe-Style, JOTWELL (Oct. 25, 2017), https://conlaw.jotwell.com/the-value-
of-moderation-tebbe-style/.  
 12. Nathan Chapman’s review of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age focused 
on this form of criticism. Nathan S. Chapman, Is There a Rawlsian Solution to Conflicts 
over Religious Liberty?, LAW & LIBERTY (Oct. 16, 2017), http://www.libertylawsite.org/
book-review/is-there-a-rawlsian-solution-to-conflicts-over-religious-liberty/.  
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Especially given his pluralist orientation, Tebbe is 
exceedingly careful to note that by identifying these four primary 
commitments he is not “denying that there may be others” (p. 49). 
But the list is, at first glance, somewhat curious, in that no 
principle or value that is specific to religion makes the top-four 
cut. Thus, there is nothing about the value of religious experience, 
the importance of faith to identity formation, the principle of 
religious freedom, or anything else that captures the unique value 
of religion within the context of clashes between religion and 
equality. This might make some wonder how Tebbe will be able 
to make good on his promise to provide “a proposal that 
appreciates the power of arguments on both sides,” and thereby 
“provide a stable, defensible foundation for the future of both 
free exercise and antidiscrimination law” (p. 5). 
This omission, however, is by design and represents one of 
the foundational commitments of Religious Freedom in An 
Egalitarian Age. As expressed in his discussion of the fairness to 
others principle, Tebbe maintains that government provision of 
religious accommodations—but withholding those same 
accommodations from those with similar, but secular objections—
“risks a particular kind of unfairness. . . . that kind of partiality 
[that] may harm the right of others to equal citizenship” (p. 72). 
Indeed, as Tebbe notes in his discussion of freedom of association, 
associational protections should not be made “specific to religious 
community groups,” but should be extended to secular groups as 
well (p. 93). Thus, Tebbe provides his take on a growing and two-
fold philosophical debate over the specialness of religion. The first 
threshold question implicated in this debate is whether religion is 
special and therefore deserving of special legal treatment.13 And 
among those rejecting religion’s specialness, the debate then turns 
to whether the law should level the playing field by granting 
analogous secular commitments the same status as religion—to 
 
 13. Compare BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013) (arguing against 
religion’s special status), and Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1427 (2012) [hereinafter Schwartzman, Not Special] (same), with 
Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness: A Response to Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?; 79 U. Chi. L. Rev 1351 (2012), 79 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 71 (2013) (arguing that religion serves as a useful proxy to promote important 
goods and thereby deserves special treatment), and Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is 
Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017) (arguing that religion promotes a range of 
important values, justifying its unique legal status).  
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“level up,” so to speak14—or whether the law should level the 
playing field by dismantling the special protections granted 
religion—to “level down,” so to speak.15 Framed in this way, 
Tebbe both discounts the specialness of religion, but advocates a 
legal strategy of leveling up so that secular commitments 
analogous to religion receive the same degree of protection. 
From a philosophical perspective, Tebbe’s view on the 
specialness of religion doesn’t stand out. It is a well-travelled 
approach to a complex philosophical question related to the status 
of religion and religious accommodation claims. But the claim is 
somewhat peculiar when considered in the context of Tebbe’s 
overall project of social coherence. To see how, consider what 
Tebbe articulates as one of the chief challenges levelled by 
skeptics against social coherence. 
According to Tebbe, the fact that his social coherence 
method only produces warranted or justified outcomes leads to 
the skeptics’ challenge that the outcomes are too subjective or 
individualistic. Tebbe provides an example of this worry: 
“Imagine a white supremacist who is internally consistent, or a 
male chauvinist who believes he has a coherent worldview that 
includes the Constitution. Surely such people cannot claim to 
have views that are rationally justified” (p. 43). And yet, social 
coherence, which asks people to build a theory whose rationality 
derives from the internal consistency of concrete judgments 
across a range of cases, seems at first glance without the resources 
to reject the claims of the racist or chauvinist as unjustifiable. 
To respond, Tebbe leans heavily on the social aspect of his 
coherence theory. According to Tebbe, the social aspect means 
that individuals rely on all sorts of precedent—including legal, 
political, and social forms of precedent—within their reasoning 
process. These forms of precedent, Tebbe explains, “shape not 
only their interests but also their information—the facts and 
arguments that they consider when they work through some new 
problem” (p. 31). Among other consequences, highlighting the 
social component of social coherence “bolsters the method’s 
appropriateness for constitutional law, which draws part of its 
legitimacy from responsiveness to popular will” (p. 32). 
 
 14. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1085 (2014). 
 15. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 13, at 94–100. 
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In turn, Tebbe argues that for a conclusion related to 
constitutional law to be warranted within a social coherence 
framework, it “must take into account precedents and principles 
that are authoritative among contemporary American jurists” (p. 
43). Thus, the arguments deployed by the racist and male 
chauvinist fail because “their claims are incoherent as 
interpretations of the Constitution because they contravene basic 
legal principles” (p. 43). For a claim to be warranted under a social 
coherence framework, a person must “assimilate uncontroverted 
features of the jurisprudence” (p. 43). So, for example, “[t]hose 
features include not only the text and history of the Equal 
Protection Clause,” but also “precedents like Brown v. Board of 
Education in the race context and parallel decisions that render 
discrimination legally suspect in the gender context” (p. 43). In 
this way, the ideologies of the racist and male chauvinist are 
“unjustified understandings of American law” (p. 43) and 
therefore cannot be considered warranted. 
The role of legal precedent as a side constraint within the 
social coherence framework is of vital importance to 
understanding Tebbe’s project. The purpose of the framework is 
to provide a method that can respond to the skeptics who view 
religious freedom jurisprudence as irrational and indeterminate. 
Tebbe’s response is that using concrete judgements to build a 
unified vision for how to resolve conflicts between religion and 
equality can generate rational and warranted conclusions. But this 
response is threatened by the rejoinder of subjectivity—that is, 
can we truly view social coherence as generating rational and 
warranted responses simply because the responses are internally 
consistent? It is to address this rejoinder of the skeptics that 
Tebbe leans heavily on the body of constitutional law, including 
its texts and legal decisions. Thus, using a social coherence 
framework to address questions of constitutional law requires 
being part of the project of constitutional law. And that project, 
what is ultimately a social project, entails remaining true to the 
“uncontroverted features of the jurisprudence,” which include 
Supreme Court precedents that are “authoritative among 
contemporary American jurists” (p. 43). 
Understanding the role of precedents in Tebbe’s scheme 
helps explain why Supreme Court decisions play such a prominent 
role in the story he tells about the principles that animate his 
vision of religious freedom and equality law. Articulating such 
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principles could have simply been done on the level of 
philosophical and moral theory. But doing so would be to miss the 
critical role of law and legal decisions in Tebbe’s method. Without 
these decisions as pegs in the coherence framework, the entire 
project slides towards the skeptic’s allegation of subjectivity. 
Indeed, one of the unique features of Tebbe’s analysis is that, 
with the exception of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, he does not 
expressly disagree with any Supreme Court precedent. This is 
apparently because it is important that the principles he describes 
not be merely “vague ideals or aspirations,” but that “[t]hey have 
the status of constitutional law” (p. 49). That is part of staving off 
the skeptic’s critique. Thus, in his chapter on the principle of 
avoiding harm to others, Tebbe doesn’t criticize Supreme Court 
opinions that might be taken to undermine the principle; instead, 
he distinguishes them. For example, Tebbe argues that 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, which upheld the constitutionality 
of the exemption that allows religious organizations to 
discriminate on the basis of religion in employment,16 can be 
understood as fully consonant with the principle of avoiding harm 
to others; that is because it can be understood as a case allowing 
some degree of harm to others when the religiously-motivated 
employer is a “church [or] closely affiliated non-profit[] that [is] 
not engaged in significant commercial activities” (p. 57). This 
special treatment of certain religious organizations stems from the 
fact that “employees are normally on notice that the religious 
organization is limited to members of the church” (p. 56). 
This penchant for distinguishing and affirming—as opposed 
to expressly rejecting—existing constitutional case law appears 
consistently throughout the book. An extreme example is Tebbe’s 
treatment of the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, in which the Court upheld the town board’s practice of 
hosting a prayer at their monthly meeting.17 Tebbe discusses 
Town of Greece in the context of the principle of government non-
endorsement (pp. 102-03). The Court’s decision in Town of 
Greece does not fit well with Tebbe’s overall judgment that “the 
paradigmatic example of government speech that violates the 
Constitution is endorsement of religion” (p. 102). Tebbe fully 
 
 16. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 17. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
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recognizes this, describing the endorsement test as “besieged,” 
noting that the test went “unsupported” in Town of Greece (p. 
102). 
But Tebbe refuses to allow the Town of Greece decision to 
change his assessment of the current status of constitutional law: 
“Still, the best understanding of constitutional law is that 
meaningful boundaries continue to limit government 
endorsement of religion” (p. 102). And in his attempt to maintain 
that government non-endorsement still represents the best 
characterization of where the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence currently stands—as opposed to where he thinks it 
ought to be—Tebbe shoehorns the case into his overall principle 
of government non-endorsement, suggesting that Town of Greece 
“arguably retained the premise that if the scheme had promoted 
a religion . . . then it would have run up against the Establishment 
Clause” (pp. 102-03).18 
This is a stretch that would at first glance seem unnecessary. 
Constitutional law scholarship is replete with articles and books 
simply arguing that the Supreme Court got certain cases wrong.19 
But Tebbe appears, at times, to go to great lengths in order to 
avoid making such pronouncements. The logic driving such a 
tactic is understandable once the reader realizes that social 
coherence needs, at least for the most part, to uphold Supreme 
Court case law so that constitutional text and constitutional 
precedent can serve as a side constraint, allowing Tebbe’s method 
to adequately respond to the skeptic who could otherwise view 
social coherence as too individualistic to generate conclusions that 
are rational or warranted. Put differently, maybe Tebbe’s 
reluctance to reject Town of Greece stems from the following 
concern: if Tebbe can simply assert that Town of Greece is 
wrongly decided, then the male chauvinist or racist can simply 
assert that the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is 
wrongly decided. Thus, while much constitutional scholarship 
 
 18. Paul Horwitz’s review of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age has noted this 
peculiar treatment of Town of Greece as well, although he does not explore the issue in the 
broader context of Tebbe’s social coherence method. See Paul Horwtiz, Both Sides Have 
Their Reasons, COMMONWEAL (October 4, 2017), https://www.commonwealmagaz
ine.org/both-sides-have-their-reasons.  
 19. For example, in the popular press, I have taken such a position—that Town of 
Greece is wrongly decided. See Michael A. Helfand, America Doesn’t See Its Religious 
Minorities, THE FORWARD (May 23, 2014), https://forward.com/opinion/198368/america-
doesn-t-see-its-religious-minorities/. 
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simply rejects Supreme Court decisions as wrongly decided, it 
does so because the authors develop theories based upon first-
order principles and then impose those principles in a top-down 
fashion on existing caselaw; Tebbe’s theory hopes to generate 
warranted judgments based on bottom-up concrete judgments 
drawn from particular constitutional dilemmas and principles. 
Case law’s side-constraint function in Tebbe’s theory appears 
to result in other somewhat uneven applications. When it comes 
to his critique of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—the one decision 
described as unjustified, even if not “necessarily unjustifiable” (p. 
69)—Tebbe is careful to emphasize that the principle of avoiding 
harm to others still retained a majority of justices (p. 68). Thus, 
Tebbe carefully counts five justices that endorsed the avoid-harm-
to-others principle, noting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
“removed” “any doubt” that the principle served as a premise of 
the Hobby Lobby decision (p. 68). Indeed, Tebbe goes so far as 
to suggest that, at least on the level of principle, avoiding harm to 
others was embraced by all of the justices, although in so doing he 
dismisses a footnote that indicates to the contrary in the Court’s 
majority opinion as “implausible and unconvincing” (p. 68). 
Accordingly, the true problem with Hobby Lobby is not, on 
Tebbe’s reading, that the Court rejected the principle of avoiding 
harm to others; it was that the Court’s decision envisioned a 
remedy—the expansion of the religious exemption so that 
employees would all receive contraception just not directly from 
the employer’s insurance coverage—that was not retroactive. As 
a result, the decision left a gap in coverage for some employees, 
thereby highlighting the Court’s failure to condition its decision 
on avoiding  harm to others in practice (p. 68). 
By contrast, when recounting the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock—a decision that addressed a 
Texas law that exempted religious publications from sales tax—
Tebbe focuses almost exclusively on Justice Brennan’s plurality 
opinion, which provides important and significant support for the 
principle of fairness to others. But the plurality opinion only gets 
Tebbe to four, which he then attempts to supplement with Justice 
Blackmun’s concurring opinion, an opinion also joined by Justice 
O’Connor (p. 75). Blackmun’s concurrence, however, is 
somewhat opaque. Tebbe emphasizes Blackmun’s conclusion that 
“[a] statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas 
offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment 
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Clause is all about”; at the same time, Blackmun also noted in his 
concurrence that “some forms of accommodating religion are 
constitutionally permissible,”20 at a minimum raising a question as 
to whether Texas Monthly can be read as supporting the 
“constitutional status” of the fairness to others principle. To be 
sure, scholars have long disputed what to make of the Court’s 
decision in Texas Monthly. The point here is that the social 
coherence method, and its need to combat the skeptics’ critique 
of subjectivism, appears to lead Tebbe to frame his principles as 
all having “the status of constitutional law,” as opposed to merely 
advancing a theory based on first-order principles as to why he 
thinks that the dissent in Hobby Lobby is correct as is the plurality 
in Texas Monthly. But that methodological need comes somewhat 
at the expense of a consistent application of when we ought to 
care about how many justices embraced specific overarching 
principles. 
As alluded to above, the most challenging tension between 
the social coherence method and Tebbe’s reliance on case law 
comes in his treatment of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, which 
reaffirmed the “ministerial exception”—the constitutional rule 
that congregations are shielded from liability under various anti-
discrimination laws when they hire and fire clergy, and potentially 
other employees integral to the congregations’ religious mission 
(p. 57). Indeed, as Tebbe notes in his discussion of freedom of 
association, associational protections should not be made 
“specific to religious community groups,” but should be extended 
to secular groups as well (p. 93). Thus, reconciling the principles 
of avoiding harm to others, freedom of association, and fairness 
to others, Tebbe advocates modifying anti-discrimination law by 
levelling up so as “to make its provisions equally available to 
sacred and secular organizations” (p. 95), characterizing 
Hosanna-Tabor as a case where “freedom of association prevails 
over the principle of avoiding harm to others” (p. 57). 
The problem with this assessment of Hosanna-Tabor is that 
it appears to conflict with the substance of the Court’s unanimous 
decision. The case addressed the claims of Cheryl Perich, a fourth-
grade teacher at a church-operated school, that her employer 
violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.21 
 
 20. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (Blackmun J., concurring). 
 21. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 
(2012). 
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The employer, however, claimed that it was shielded from liability 
by the ministerial exception because Perich was a “called 
teacher.”22 Perich and the EEOC, in pressing the case, argued that 
whatever protections were afforded religious institutions by the 
First Amendment stemmed from the freedom of association and 
not the religion clauses.23 Thus, as characterized by the Court, 
“[t]he EEOC and Perich . . . see no need—and no basis—for a 
special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion 
Clauses themselves.”24 
The Court, however, rejected Perich’s claims and specifically 
attacked this argument. According to the Court, 
We find this position untenable. . . . It follows under the 
EEOC’s and Perich’s view that the First Amendment analysis 
should be the same, whether the association in question is the 
Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club. That result is 
hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, 
which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.25 
Now it is completely reasonable to disagree with this 
conclusion as being philosophically unsound. Many critics of 
granting religious claims special legal status have done just that—
attacked this argument as philosophically incoherent.26 But to 
characterize the principle of fairness to others as a “constitutional 
commitment” (p. 71) and having “the status of constitutional law” 
(p. 49) would seem, at least without some discussion or 
qualification, to mis-describe the current state of the Supreme 
Court’s religion clause jurisprudence.27 Indeed, in Hosanna-Tabor 
there aren’t even any concurrences or dissents upon which to hang 
the proverbial hat; the opinion was unanimous and seems to, at a 
bare minimum, discount the fairness to others principle, given 
 
 22. Id. at 699–700, 708 (differentiating “called teachers”—teachers “called to their 
vocation by God through a congregation”—from “contract teachers”—teachers 
“appointed by the school board without a vote of the congregation”). 
 23. See Oral Argument at 37:22-25, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (“We don’t see that 
line of church autonomy principles in the Religion Clause jurisprudence as such. We see it 
as a question of freedom of association.”).  
 24. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 13; Schwartzman, Not Special, supra note 13. 
 27. Moreover, and without going into detail here, the current state of the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence would also seem to manifest a view that 
religion is subject to special treatment—a view that is, of course, subject to philosophical 
criticism.  
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that Tebbe formulates the principles as follows: “government 
favoritism on the basis of religion risks a particular kind of 
unfairness. . . . that kind of partiality may harm the right of others 
to equal citizenship” (p. 72). That formulation does not, at least in 
an obvious way, fit with the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor. 
To reiterate, Tebbe could conclude that the Court’s decision 
in Hosanna-Tabor was wrongly decided. But given that Supreme 
Court case law apparently serves as an essential side constraint in 
the social coherence framework—preventing social coherence 
from sliding into subjectivism—one understands his reluctance to 
do so. For Tebbe, warranted constitutional interpretations “must 
assimilate uncontroverted features of the jurisprudence” (p. 43). 
Now one of the challenges when assessing the role of Supreme 
Court decisions in the social coherence method is that Tebbe does 
not quite provide a framework for what counts as an 
“uncontroverted feature[] of the jurisprudence.” It therefore 
leaves open the possibility that if in the context of equal 
protection, “[t]hose features include not only the text and history 
of the Equal Protection Clause, but precedents like Brown v. 
Board of Education” (p. 43), then it might also be true, given that 
it was unanimously decided, that uncontroverted features of the 
jurisprudence also include not only the text and history of the 
religion clauses, but precedents like Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. 
Of course, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC is not Brown v. Board 
of Education. Accordingly, maybe Tebbe has a theory working in 
the background of his assessments that privileges some 
constitutional precedents over others—maybe even some sort of 
view of “super-precedents”28—such that some cases are, on his 
view, far more fundamental to constitutional law and 
jurisprudence, and therefore far more “authoritative among 
contemporary American jurists” (p. 43). But, as already noted, 
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age doesn’t provide much in 
terms of explanation on this point to help the reader flesh out 
which decisions do and don’t count as “uncontroverted features 
of the jurisprudence” (p. 43). Moreover, if there are some cases 
 
 28. The concept of super-precedents entered public debate during the confirmation 
hearings of Justice John Roberts. See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in 
‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at C1. It has also been a topic of significant 
discussion in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-
Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363 (2007); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976). 
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that have garnered insufficient support to qualify as necessary 
features of the constitutional enterprise—such that disagreement 
with them would not render someone’s interpretations as 
illegitimate “understanding[s] of the United States constitution” 
(p. 43)—then it remains a wonder that Tebbe does not simply 
dismiss cases like Town of Greece v. Galloway and Hosanna-
Tabor v. EEOC as wrongly decided. 
More likely is that Tebbe’s commitment to social 
coherence—and its ability to respond to charges of subjectivism—
requires that he not unsettle too much constitutional case law. For 
without that anchor, the social element in the social coherence 
framework might not be able to generate warranted or rational 
judgments that do not fall prey to claims of indeterminacy. 
However, Tebbe’s understandable reluctance to reject 
constitutional decisions—and instead to massage tensions 
between them and his primary principles—paints an 
uncomfortable picture that leaves the reader wondering if there is 
a principled way for Tebbe to read existing Supreme Court case 
law. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The criticisms of the last section notwithstanding, Tebbe’s 
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is first-rate work that 
should be read by anyone interested in questions of religious 
freedom and equality law. Ultimately, the drawbacks of Tebbe’s 
approach are a function of the project’s ambitious aims—to find a 
way to reason about conflicts between religion and equality 
without simply allowing debate to devolve into rancorous name-
calling or bald assertions about how the law ought to decide. 
Tebbe seeks to leverage our intuitions about concrete cases so 
that we can build a bottom-up picture that accounts for the 
multiple values at stake in any given case. This pluralist impulse is 
to be lauded—indeed, I myself have endorsed something like it 
elsewhere.29 But the cries of the skeptic still loom large in such an 
approach, asking us whether our commitment to consistency and 
fit can overcome the accusations of subjectivity. These questions 
 
 29. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Implied Consent: A Primer and a Defense, 50 
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, 
Implied Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (2015).  
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remain not just for Tebbe, but for any scholar of constitutional 
theory and interpretation. 
 
